

Victory in Peace

A Peace Plan to End the War in Ukraine

Peace is the greatest victory

Victory is often imagined in military terms—territory gained, enemies defeated, parades held.

But the true measure of a nation's strength is not found in conquest or destruction, but in its ability to secure peace, preserve life, and build a future for its people. For Ukraine, the greatest victory would not be the prolonging of war, but the restoration of peace.

There is a dangerous tendency among politicians to treat peace as a loss, as if the absence of war were a kind of defeat.

This is not only untrue—it is deeply harmful.

Peace is not weakness. Peace is not surrender. Peace is the supreme goal, the condition in which life can flourish, where homes can be rebuilt, and where the future becomes possible once again.

When former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson claimed that Ukraine would "get nothing" from peace proposals, such as those discussed by US President Donald Trump, he failed to recognise the true value of peace.

What Ukraine *gets* is beyond material measure. Ukraine gets:

- Cities free from bombardment.
- Families reunited, not separated by death or conscription.
- Schools that open in the morning, and close safely at night.
- A generation of children who grow up in peace, not war.
- A nation that can invest in its future, instead of burying its past.

These are not "nothing". These are everything.

What Ukraine *get* from peace is priceless.

A peace that is secure, and sustainable is a victory for the Ukrainian people, and for all humanity.

The path to such peace is difficult, and requires compromise, courage, and wisdom.

But it must be the path we seek—because peace is not the absence of victory. Peace is the greatest victory.

Contents

Motivation	3
Simplicity	
Priorities	4
Obstacles & Distractions	5
Incorrect Mindset	
Continued Supply of Weapons	6
Accession to the European Union	6
Ambition to Join NATO	7
Assessment & Understanding	8
Lessons from previous Conflicts	
Independent Decision-Making	9
Russian Resolve	10
Objectives Cannot Be Achieved Militarily	10
Human Cost of the War	12
Referenda in Occupied Regions of Ukraine	15
The Peace Plan	22
Witnesses	
Sanction Relief	23
Step One: Winding Down	24
Step Two: Ceasefire	26
Step Three: Peace	27
Comparison with Previous Peace Proposals	40
Conclusion	44

Motivation

Ukraine is a relatively young country, having achieved independence on 24 August 1991. As a young nation, its allies must sincerely understand their responsibility to provide support and guidance—especially when advising on matters of great importance.

This peace plan is written with the utmost sincerity and goodwill, with the intention of bringing an end to the war and establishing lasting peace.

It is the hope of the author that this document will be received in the spirit in which it is offered—as a framework for a realistic and practical path to peace.

Discussions about peace often refer to the term `just peace`.

Beyond ‘justice’, the word ‘just’ can also mean ‘simple’, and it is in this sense that this document is focused.

It aims to simplify dialogue and lead directly to peace.

Simplicity

To resolve any conflict, we must first understand it in its simplest form.

Complexity often obscures the core issue, and therefore, clarity is essential.

In the case of the Russia–Ukraine war, the fundamental dispute is between two nations—Russia and Ukraine.

While many external actors are involved politically, diplomatically, and militarily, a lasting peace can only emerge from a direct agreement between these two parties.

Third-party nations may offer valuable mediation, technical support, or international guarantees, but their involvement should aim to support—not complicate—the peace process.

Constructive contributions are welcome, but must be focused on enabling a clear, bilateral resolution.

Priorities

When addressing any problem and seeking a solution, it is essential to clarify our priorities—what matters most?

This is necessary so that we may focus on solving the problem and remove obstacles and distractions that can prevent the problem from being resolved.

In addition to identifying priorities, we must also consider what we are prepared to do or to compromise in order to achieve those priorities.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has used the phrase "servant of the people", rightly identifying that the people are of utmost importance.

Politicians often lose sight of the welfare of the population, and rarely perceive themselves as servants of the people.

- Human life must be the top priority.
- The overwhelming priority is to simply end the war.
- All other matters are secondary.

Obstacles & Distractions

To achieve peace, we must focus all efforts on that single, vital goal. Anything that distracts or diverts attention from this objective must be set aside. Peace is a fragile opportunity that demands unity of purpose, realism, and sacrifice.

Below are the key distraction that divert attention away from peace, these distractions must be removed or paused if we are to succeed.

Incorrect Mindset

From the outset of this war, the prevailing mindset among Western politicians has been one of "peace through strength."

The assumption has been that only military power and resistance will deter Russia. However, as argued in later sections of this document, Russia appears fully committed to achieving its objectives regardless of external pressure.

More recently, as political leaders begin to acknowledge the eventual need for peace negotiations, a new notion has emerged: that Ukraine must be placed in the "strongest possible position" before talks can begin.

While this signals a slight shift in attitude, it still stems from the same flawed premise—that military leverage will bring about peace. In reality, no amount of additional weapons or prolonged confrontation will significantly alter Ukraine's negotiating position. This approach only delays the necessary transition to diplomacy.

This mindset is often reinforced by a political culture that values a 'macho' image of strength and dominance.

As a result, genuine attempts at negotiation are frequently dismissed or ridiculed. The unhelpful and inflammatory term "appeasement" is used to scorn any call for peaceful compromise. But this term is misplaced. Serious negotiations will inevitably require compromise from both sides, and this should not be seen as weakness but as responsible and mature diplomacy.

Ukraine, too, has been focused on achieving military victory rather than prioritising peace. This mindset is problematic, we shouldn't think in terms of winning or losing but rather we must focus on finding a peaceful solution.

And as this document argues, **peace is the greatest victory.**

Continued Supply of Weapons

The continued flow of weapons into Ukraine, while intended to help defend the nation, in reality prolongs the conflict and delays the possibility of peace. As long as arms continue to arrive, there remains the incentive—and the capacity—for both sides to keep fighting. This is why a staged "winding down" of military support is essential.

The ceasefire phase, which is necessary for meaningful negotiations, cannot be reached while the supply of weapons continues. A gradual reduction of arms leading to a complete halt will help create the conditions for a stable and monitored ceasefire. Only in an environment where fighting stops can diplomacy and reconciliation begin.

Accession to the European Union

At this moment, Ukraine's primary focus must be peace—not political realignment. Talks of accession to the European Union, while important in the long term, are a distraction at a time when the nation must be united around the single goal of ending war and saving lives.

The European Union can be a divisive force. Across the continent, EU membership is not universally supported. The United Kingdom's departure (Brexit), and growing anti-EU sentiment in other countries, shows that not all populations see the EU as the right choice. In Ukraine—a country with a complex history and diverse population—this division is even more pronounced.

Indeed, the 2013 Euromaidan protests, which centred around a pro-European direction, were followed by the 2014 Crimean referendum and the rise of separatist movements in the Donbass. It is realistic and important to acknowledge that many in eastern and southern Ukraine do not support EU membership. The goal of peace must come before questions of EU integration.

In fact, during his 2019 election campaign, President Zelensky promised to hold a referendum on membership of the European Union.

Under normal circumstances, Ukraine would not be pursuing accession without first carrying out this public vote.

However, the 2022 Russian invasion significantly altered the political landscape and has forced Zelensky's hand, pushing Ukraine toward accelerated EU alignment.

Before accession talks can responsibly continue, Ukraine must return to a state of normality and national stability — at which point, a referendum could be held to democratically confirm the will of the people.

Ambition to Join NATO

The ambition to join NATO has long been a source of tension between Ukraine and Russia, and it is one of the contributing factors to the current conflict. It is, therefore, not a priority. In fact, putting aside NATO ambitions could be a powerful gesture toward de-escalation.

Importantly, Ukraine is not currently a NATO member. Abandoning a goal is not the same as surrendering something already held. Ukraine loses nothing by stepping back from its NATO aspirations, and in doing so, it removes a central point of contention.

Neutrality, in itself, is a form of defense. Neutral countries are seen as non-threatening and are therefore less likely to become targets of aggression. Switzerland is a clear and powerful example. Its neutrality allowed it to avoid invasion and direct involvement in both World Wars. A similar approach could serve Ukraine well by providing a foundation for long-term security through diplomacy rather than military alliances.

Assessment & Understanding

Lessons from previous Conflicts

The wars in Syria and Libya offer sobering lessons about the unintended consequences of military escalation and external intervention.

In *Destroying a Nation*, former Dutch diplomat Nikolaos van Dam highlights how Syria was destroyed not only by the brutality of the Assad regime, but also by the strategic miscalculations of Western powers.

External support for opposition groups, absent a unified political plan or understanding of Syria's internal complexities, prolonged the war, fractured the opposition, and contributed to state collapse.

What began as a localised uprising evolved into a prolonged proxy conflict, drawing in regional and global powers and resulting in vast civilian suffering and the near-total destruction of the country's institutions.

Libya presents a parallel failure.

The NATO-led intervention in 2011, while ostensibly aimed at protecting civilians, resulted in the rapid overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi but without a viable post-conflict plan.

The power vacuum that followed led to years of civil war, competing governments, regional militias, and foreign interference — a state of chaos arguably worse than the one it aimed to end.

Like Syria, Libya demonstrated the limits of force without foresight, and the danger of prioritising regime change over sustainable governance.

In both cases, well-intentioned interventions became catalysts for long-term instability, in part because of the overestimation of democratic outcomes and the underestimation of entrenched political dynamics.

Other examples, such as the Iraq War and Afghanistan, also reinforce this pattern: military victories unsupported by coherent political strategy or local legitimacy result not in peace, but in protracted conflict.

In the context of Ukraine, the lesson is clear: while military assistance may be necessary in the short term, it cannot substitute for a political solution.

Without a clear diplomatic track, and without respecting the sovereignty and agency of the Ukrainian people themselves, there is a real danger that the conflict becomes another drawn-out war in which foreign interests prolong violence without resolving its causes.

Independent Decision-Making

The preceding sections, *Lessons from Past Conflicts* and *Incorrect Mindset*, serve as a clear warning: nations that rely too heavily on foreign allies without maintaining control over their own strategy often suffer prolonged conflict, fractured sovereignty, or national collapse. Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan each demonstrate the limits — and at times, the dangers — of placing blind trust in external powers whose interests are not always aligned with those of the local population.

Ukraine must learn from these examples and act decisively in the interests of its own people. While the support of allies has been critical in resisting invasion and preserving statehood, Ukraine must now consider its long-term wellbeing, not just its battlefield position. It is Ukrainians — not foreign advisers or donors — who are dying, suffering, and losing their homes. This reality must guide every strategic decision moving forward.

True national sovereignty means having the courage to act independently, even when doing so may disappoint or diverge from the preferences of international partners. Western allies, while well-intentioned, have their own political cycles, economic constraints, and geopolitical priorities. Their commitment to Ukraine is conditional and can change — as history has shown — rapidly and unpredictably.

This peace plan does not suggest that Ukraine discounts its allies. Rather, it urges Ukraine to exercise discernment: to accept only the support that aligns with the national interest, and to reject policies — no matter how strongly promoted by allies — that risk prolonging the war, deepening social divisions, or delaying peace.

Ukraine must retain its decision-making power and choose peace when it becomes available, not when it becomes politically convenient for others.

In this spirit, the pursuit of peace should be understood as the highest expression of Ukrainian independence — a sovereign decision, made by and for Ukrainians, to restore life, security, and dignity to the nation.

Russian Resolve

We must acknowledge that Russia is firmly committed to its objectives, and current strategies have not succeeded in altering its course.

Sanctions and military aid to Ukraine **will not**, and likely **cannot**, force Russia into a ceasefire.

Attempts to influence behaviour are more effective when positive rather than punitive—sanctions and arms are perceived negatively and risk entrenching resistance.

A ceasefire is a positive goal, and we must pursue it with positive methods. Using negative tools to achieve positive outcomes is often counterproductive.

- We must understand Russia's stated objectives and seek alternatives to further conflict.
- Positive outcomes are best achieved through constructive, not coercive, means.
- We must **refrain** from relying on punitive methods alone.

Objectives Cannot Be Achieved Militarily

Both sides must acknowledge that their ultimate objectives cannot be fully achieved through military means alone. The ongoing conflict continues to inflict immense human suffering, economic damage, and global instability, yet neither party has made decisive strategic gains sufficient to realise their political aims.

Russia's Objectives

Russia has articulated several objectives throughout the conflict, either officially or through state media and diplomatic statements. These can be summarised as follows:

1. Denazification of Ukraine

This term has been widely interpreted to mean the removal of anti-Russian sentiment from Ukrainian governance, protection of Russian-speaking populations, and reassertion of traditional Orthodox values.

This objective cannot be achieved through military conquest. Even with territorial gains, Russia cannot force cultural or political change on Ukraine. Protection of Russian language rights and religious freedoms would require a signed agreement, monitored and enforced diplomatically.

2. Control over Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics

Russia recognises these territories as independent or as part of the Russian Federation. While military conquest may secure these areas, it would come at enormous cost, including further international isolation.

Military achievement is possible but unsustainable. A peaceful settlement including referenda and special status offers a more durable and internationally acceptable solution.

3. Ukrainian Neutrality (No NATO Membership)

Russia's long-standing demand is for Ukraine to remain neutral and not join NATO.

This cannot be enforced militarily. Even occupation would not prevent future political realignment without a binding agreement. Only a constitutional neutrality clause ratified by referendum would meet this objective.

4. Land Access to Transnistria (Moldova)

While not always stated explicitly, Russia appears interested in establishing a land corridor to Transnistria, a breakaway Moldovan region with a Russian military presence.

This would require military conquest of Odesa and southern Ukraine, which is not only militarily difficult but would risk direct confrontation with NATO and further destabilise the region.

If neutrality and cultural autonomy for Russian speakers were achieved, Russia's strategic interest in such a corridor may be reduced.

Ukraine's Objectives

Ukraine also has clear strategic and moral goals in this war:

1. Restoration of Sovereign Borders (1991 Lines)

This includes reclaiming Crimea and all occupied parts of Donbas.

This is unlikely to be achieved militarily without massive escalation or foreign intervention. A negotiated settlement with international backing and transitional arrangements offers a more realistic pathway to peace.

2. Security Guarantees Against Future Russian Aggression

Ukraine seeks long-term security, historically through NATO or Western integration.

Military action alone cannot guarantee future security. Only signed multilateral agreements with enforcement mechanisms can address this.

3. Preservation of National Identity and Independence

Ukraine wants to remain an independent, democratic state free from foreign influence.

This is already achieved in principle, but military escalation risks compromising this through further destruction and economic collapse. Peaceful dialogue and rebuilding would better protect Ukraine's sovereignty.

4. Justice and Accountability for War Crimes

Ukraine demands justice for atrocities committed during the war.

Justice cannot be delivered solely through warfare. International legal processes and truth-and-reconciliation mechanisms must be used alongside any peace settlement.

Human Cost of the War

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has resulted in significant human suffering, with substantial military and civilian casualties on both sides.

The following statistics, drawn from various reputable sources, highlight the scale of the tragedy and add evidence to the urgent need to end the war:

Military Casualties

Ukrainian Armed Forces

- **Killed:**
 - **45,100** as reported by President Zelensky in February 2025.
 - **68,925** documented by name as of April 2025 by the UALosses project, verified by Mediazona and BBC News Russian.
 - **Up to 80,000** according to a confidential Ukrainian estimate cited by the Wall Street Journal in September 2024.
- **Wounded:**
 - **Over 390,000** as stated by President Zelensky.
 - **400,000** according to the same confidential Ukrainian estimate.
- **Missing:**
 - Approximately **63,000** as of February 2025, with 90% believed to be soldiers.

Russian Armed Forces

- **Killed:**
 - **5,937** officially reported by Russia's Ministry of Defence in September 2022.
 - **106,745** verified deaths documented by BBC News Russian and Mediazona as of May 2025.
 - **Between 158,885 and 229,500** estimated actual deaths by the same sources, considering underreporting.
- **Wounded:**
 - **Over 700,000** as estimated by Russia Matters in April 2025.
- **Missing:**
 - Approximately **48,000** as of January 2025.

Russian Claims on Ukrainian Casualties

- In mid-December 2024, Russia claimed that Ukrainian military casualties had reached **almost 1,000,000** killed and wounded.

Civilian Casualties

- **Ukraine:**
 - **12,910 killed** and **30,700 injured** as reported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) by March 31, 2025.
- **Russia:**
 - **652 civilian deaths** reported within Russia due to the conflict as of April 2025.

Displacement and Humanitarian Impact

- **Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs):** Approximately **3.7 million** within Ukraine.
- **Refugees:** About **6.9 million** Ukrainians have fled the country.
- **Humanitarian Needs:** The United Nations has identified **12.7 million** Ukrainians in need of humanitarian assistance, with current funding constraints limiting aid to **4.8 million** individuals.

Discrepancies in Casualty Estimates

The significant differences between Russian and Western estimates of Ukrainian casualties can be attributed to several factors:

- **Propaganda and Information Warfare:** Both Russia and Ukraine have strategic reasons to manipulate casualty figures for domestic and international audiences.
- **Verification Challenges:** Independent verification of casualties is difficult in active conflict zones, leading to reliance on estimates and incomplete data.
- **Differing Methodologies:** Variations in how casualties are counted (e.g., including missing personnel, multiple injuries to the same individual, or only confirmed deaths) can lead to divergent figures.

These figures represent not just numbers but lives disrupted and communities devastated. The immense human suffering reinforces the imperative for all parties to prioritize peace negotiations and work towards a sustainable resolution to the conflict.

Referenda in Occupied Regions of Ukraine

The legality of these referenda can be disputed; however, they did take place and must be acknowledged.

They indicate that a sentiment favouring closer ties with Russia may exist within these regions—if not clearly, then at least ambiguously.

Therefore, full reintegration with Ukraine might not be in the best interest of the populations of these oblasts.

It is recommended that these referenda be repeated during the stability of a ceasefire period, conducted freely, fairly, with international observers present to ensure legitimacy and to truly reflect the will of the people.

2014 Donbas Status Referendums

Donetsk People's Republic (DPR)

Date: 11 May 2014

Question: Do you support the declaration of state independence of the Donetsk People's Republic?

Result: 89% in favor, with a turnout of approximately 75%.

Choice	Votes	Percentage
Yes	2,252,867	89%
No	256,040	11%
Total Votes	2,508,907	100%
Turnout	—	~75%

Note: Voting occurred in areas under separatist control, which did not encompass the entire Donetsk oblast.

Luhansk People's Republic (LPR)

Date: 11 May 2014

Question: Do you support the declaration of state independence of the Luhansk People's Republic?

Result: 96.2% in favor, with a reported turnout of 81%.

Choice	Votes	Percentage
Yes	—	96.2%
No	—	3.8%
Total Votes	—	100%
Turnout	—	81%

Note: Specific vote counts were not publicly disclosed. Voting occurred in areas under separatist control, which did not encompass the entire Luhansk oblast.

2022 Annexation Referendums

Donetsk People's Republic (DPR)

Date: 23–27 September 2022

Question: Do you approve of the Donetsk People's Republic being incorporated into the Russian Federation with subject rights of the Russian Federation?

Result: 99.23% in favor, with a turnout of 97.51%.

Choice	Votes	Percentage
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Choice	Votes	Percentage
Yes	2,116,800	99.23%
No	—	0.77%
Total Votes	2,131,207	100%
Turnout	—	97.51%

Note: Voting was conducted only in areas under Russian occupation, which constituted approximately 60% of Donetsk oblast.

Luhansk People's Republic (LPR)

Date: 23–27 September 2022

Question: Do you approve of the Luhansk People's Republic being incorporated into the Russian Federation with subject rights of the Russian Federation?

Result: 98.42% in favor, with a turnout of 94.15%.

Choice	Votes	Percentage
Yes	1,636,302	98.42%
No	—	1.58%
Total Votes	1,662,607	100%
Turnout	—	94.15%

Note: Voting was conducted only in areas under Russian occupation, which constituted over 90% of Luhansk oblast.

Zaporizhzhia Region

Victory in Peace: A Peace Plan to End the War in Ukraine

Date: 23–27 September 2022

Question: Do you approve of the Zaporizhzhia Region being incorporated into the Russian Federation with subject rights of the Russian Federation?

Result: 93.11% in favor, with a turnout of 85.4%.

Choice	Votes	Percentage
Yes	430,268	93.11%
No	—	6.89%
Total Votes	541,093	100%
Turnout	—	85.4%

Note: Voting was conducted only in areas under Russian occupation, which constituted more than 70% of Zaporizhzhia oblast.

Kherson Region

Date: 23–27 September 2022

Question: Do you approve of the Kherson Region being incorporated into the Russian Federation with subject rights of the Russian Federation?

Result: 87.05% in favor, with a turnout of 78.86%.

Choice	Votes	Percentage
Yes	497,051	87.05%
No	68,832	12.05%
Total Votes	571,001	100%
Turnout	—	78.86%

Note: Voting was conducted only in areas under Russian occupation, which constituted over 90% of Kherson oblast.

Crimea

As part of the Soviet Union, Crimea was administratively transferred to the Ukrainian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) in 1954.

The referenda held in Crimea demonstrate a consistent trend of public sentiment favouring closer alignment with Russia.

While the legality and conditions surrounding the 2014 referendum are disputed by many in the international community, it is important to acknowledge that the event occurred and that its outcome likely reflects, at least in part, the prevailing views of the Crimean population.

In light of this, it is reasonable to question whether reintegration with Ukraine aligns with the will of the Crimean people.

It is therefore recommended that a new referendum be held under internationally monitored conditions, with clearly defined, unambiguous questions that explicitly state the intent and consequences of each choice.

Referenda in Crimea

1991 Crimean autonomy referendum

Date: 20 January 1991

Question: Do you support re-establishing the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a subject of the Union SSR and a participant of the Union Treaty?

Result: Approved by 94.3% of voters.

Choice	Votes	Percentage
Yes	1,343,855	94.3%
No	81,254	5.7%

Choice	Votes	Percentage
Total Valid Votes	1,425,109	100%
Invalid/Blank Votes	15,910	—
Total Votes Cast	1,441,019	—
Registered Voters / Turnout	1,770,841	81.4%

1994 Crimean referendum

Date: 27 March 1994

Questions and Results:

1. Greater Autonomy within Ukraine – Approved by 78.4%
2. Dual Russian and Ukrainian Citizenship – Approved by 82.8%
3. Presidential Decrees to Have Status of Laws – Approved by 77.9%

Question	For (%)	Against (%)
Greater Autonomy within Ukraine	78.4%	21.6%
Dual Russian and Ukrainian Citizenship	82.8%	17.2%
Presidential Decrees to Have Status of Laws	77.9%	22.1%

Note: Specific vote counts and turnout figures are not available in the public sources.

2014 Crimean status referendum

Date: 16 March 2014

Questions:

- 1. Do you support the reunification of Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation?
- 2. Do you support the restoration of the 1992 Constitution of Crimea and the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine?

Result: Officially, 96.8% voted in favour of joining Russia with an 83.1% turnout.

Choice	Votes	Percentage of Valid Votes
Join Russia	1,233,002	97.5%
Remain in Ukraine (restore 1992 Constitution)	31,997	2.5%
Total Valid Votes	1,264,999	100%
Invalid/Blank Votes	9,097	—
Total Votes Cast	1,274,096	—
Registered Voters / Turnout	~1,533,208	83.1%

Note: The legitimacy of this referendum is widely disputed due to the presence of Russian troops and lack of international observers.

The Peace Plan

Witnesses

Both Step 2 (Ceasefire) and Step 3 (Peace) will require the signing of official documents. These documents must be signed in front of international witnesses, who will vouch for the sincerity of each signatory.

They will serve as **security guarantors**, holding each party accountable to the agreement.

Each party—Russia and Ukraine—may choose one or more witnesses, but the number of witnesses must be equal (e.g. two each).

Recommended Witnesses

For Russia:

- Federative Republic of Brazil
- People's Republic of China
- Republic of India

For Ukraine:

- United States of America
- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- French Republic

Responsibilities of Witnesses

- Vouch for the honesty and sincerity of their supported party.
- Monitor ongoing compliance with signed agreements (ceasefire and peace).
- Implement diplomatic consequences if their party breaches the agreement.

Sanction Relief

Economic sanctions have played a central role in the international response to the conflict. However, for any lasting peace agreement to be viable, sanctions imposed on Russia must be addressed as part of the negotiation process and linked to verifiable milestones.

Sanctions should not be removed all at once, but rather phased out gradually in parallel with the implementation of the peace agreement. This ensures that compliance by all parties is incentivised and that the process remains reversible in the event of violations.

Principles for Sanction Relief

1. Conditionality

Sanction relief must be directly tied to specific, measurable actions taken by Russia to uphold its commitments under the peace agreement. These may include:

- Complete ceasefire implementation
- Withdrawal from specified territories
- Respect for referendum outcomes
- Guarantee of cultural and religious freedoms
- Non-interference in Ukraine's internal affairs

2. Verification Mechanisms

An independent international monitoring body must verify Russia's compliance at each stage. Only upon confirmation should sanctions be lifted in corresponding stages.

3. Staged Relief Process

Sanction relief should be divided into phases:

- *Phase 1:* Easing of humanitarian and agricultural trade restrictions upon initial ceasefire
- *Phase 2:* Suspension of selected economic and financial restrictions after verified troop withdrawals and respect for referenda
- *Phase 3:* Broader economic reintegration into international institutions once the full agreement is honoured over a sustained period

1. Reversibility Clause

In the event of non-compliance or renewed aggression, sanctions can be re-imposed swiftly and proportionately. This ensures continued leverage for enforcement of the peace deal.

2. Communication and Transparency

Clear communication with the public and international stakeholders is essential. Sanction relief should not be misinterpreted as endorsement of past actions, but rather as a reward for present and future compliance in pursuit of peace.

Step One: Winding Down

The first step is to reduce hostilities and build trust.

This includes a mutual commitment to de-escalation in preparation for a ceasefire.

It would be a significant jump to go from the extreme of fighting intense battles to suddenly enter into a ceasefire, that is why a gradual wind down is essential.

We need to work toward a situation where weapons are no longer needed and this winding down phase will help us to get there.

Responsibilities of Ukraine's Partners

The following are required, except where stated, responsibilities of the ceasefire agreement.

- Reduce military aid to Ukraine.
 - Optionally defensive ammunition *may* continue to be supplied.
- Engage in discussions with Ukraine to nominate witnesses and agree on a ceasefire target date.

Responsibilities of Ukraine

The following are required, except where stated, responsibilities of the ceasefire agreement.

- Request allies to halt military aid.
 - Optionally defensive ammunition *may* continue to be requested.
- Maintain current positions on the battlefield and **do not advance**.
- **Restrict fire** to defensive retaliation only.
 - No attacks on Russian territory or occupied areas.
- **Pause** mobilisation.

Responsibilities of Russia

The following are required, except where stated, responsibilities of the ceasefire agreement.

- Request allies to halt military aid.
 - Optionally defensive ammunition *may* continue to be requested.
- Maintain current positions on the battlefield **do not advances**.
- **Restrict fire** to defensive retaliation only.
 - No attacks on Ukrainian territory beyond immediate front lines.
- **Pause** mobilisation.

Target Date

A specific date must be agreed upon for the ceasefire to begin.

This date should be proposed with input from both parties and their international partners.

It is essential that this target date must be communicate with and mutually agreed upon by Russia, so that de-escalation can be synchronised

As of May 2025, Ukraine has extended martial law and general mobilisation until **7 August 2025**.

This date, already acknowledged in law and public expectation, presents a natural and practical milestone for the initiation of a formal ceasefire.

Aligning peace efforts with this date allows all parties—Ukraine, Russia, and their respective partners—to work towards a clear and time-bound objective.

The period leading up to this date can be used for de-escalation, nomination of witnesses, and preparation for monitored compliance.

By focusing efforts on this target, the window for peace can be opened in a structured and credible manner, facilitating a meaningful transition from war to diplomacy.

Proposed target date for beginning of ceasefire: **7 August 2025**.

Step Two: Ceasefire

This is the formal start of peace-building.

Peace cannot be negotiated whilst fighting continues, the stability and calmness brought by a ceasefire will allow for negotiations to be conducted.

Responsibilities of Ukraine's Partners

The following are required, except where stated, responsibilities of the ceasefire agreement.

- **Suspend all military aid** to Ukraine throughout the duration of the ceasefire.
 - This includes, weapons and ammunition, both offensive and defensive, vehicles and equipment.
- Optionally medical assets, such as ambulances and mobile hospitals, *may* be deployed to Ukraine.
 - Any deployed medical asset must be clearly identifiable with a red cross.
 - Russia must be notified of the location of such medical assets.
- **Must not** send military personnel to Ukraine.
 - Medical professionals, such as doctors and nurses, *may* be deployed.
 - Civilian officials *may* be deployed to assist with the successful rollout of referenda and in the case of Presidential Elections.
 - Any deployed professional or official must have clear identification, which they must carry at all times.
 - Russia must be notified of the identity and location of any deployed professional or official.

- Ukraine's accession to the European Union must be paused throughout the duration of the ceasefire and peace negotiations.
- Discussions and ambitions for Ukraine's accession to join NATO must be paused.

Responsibilities of Ukraine

The follow are required, except where stated, responsibilities of the ceasefire agreement.

- The cessation of all military activity.
- End mobilisation and conscription.
 - Conscripts may be temporarily discharged.
- Allow referenda to be held in disputed territories.
- Optionally martial law *may* be lifted.
- Optionally Presidential elections *may* be held.
- Must accept a pause of it's accession to the European Union in order to focus on achieving peace.

Responsibilities of Russia

The following are required responsibilities of the ceasefire agreement.

- The cessation of all military activity.
- Allow referenda to be held in disputed territories.
- End mobilisation and conscription.
 - Conscripts may be temporarily discharged.

Step Three: Peace

This section outlines the terms of a formal peace treaty, including territorial recognition, reparations or amnesties, governance of disputed regions, and potential roles for international peacekeeping forces.

Peace negotiations will be conducted directly between Russia and Ukraine, with allied partners invited to participate as mediators or observers to help achieve a constructive and lasting agreement.

Any peace treaty agreed upon will likely require significant amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution and must therefore be ratified by a national referendum.

This referendum may be held concurrently with the presidential elections.

Responsibilities of Ukraine

- Ukrainian forces will withdraw from any territory currently under their control within Russia's **Kursk** and **Belgorod** oblasts, which will be returned to Russia.
- Ukraine must formally and explicitly commit to **not joining NATO**.
 - A declaration of **permanent neutrality** should be written into the Ukrainian Constitution.
- Ukraine may, at its discretion, continue its accession process toward **European Union** membership.
- Ukraine must recognise Russian language rights and respect for Russian minorities.
- Ukraine must accept the religious freedoms of Russian minorities.

Responsibilities of Russia

- Russian forces will withdraw from territory currently under their control within Ukraine's **Sumy**, **Chernihiv**, and **Kharkiv** oblasts, returning these areas to Ukraine.

Language Rights and Cultural Respect

In order to support reconciliation and long-term stability, Ukraine shall recognise the cultural and linguistic rights of its Russian-speaking population, particularly in those oblasts where Russian is widely spoken. This recognition does not imply granting Russian the status of a second national language, but rather the implementation of regionally appropriate protections and freedoms.

Ukraine shall adopt a model similar to that of the United Kingdom's treatment of the Welsh language. In the UK, Welsh is an official language in Wales but not in England, and its use is guaranteed in public services, education, and cultural life where there is demand.

In line with this model, Ukraine will:

- Maintain Ukrainian as the sole national language.
- Permit regional and municipal authorities to designate Russian as a secondary official language in areas where Russian is spoken by a significant portion of the population (e.g. 20% or more).
- Ensure public services, official documents, and education are available in Russian in these regions.
- Protect the right to Russian-language media, literature, and cultural institutions.
- Guarantee the freedom of religious practice and cultural expression for Russian-speaking communities.

This approach protects Ukrainian sovereignty and identity while fulfilling international standards on minority rights and removing a core grievance that has contributed to the conflict.

These language provisions may be enshrined in Ukraine's constitution or a separate framework law as part of a peace settlement, and any changes would be subject to national ratification.

Religious Freedom and National Unity

Ukraine recognises the importance of religious freedom as a pillar of democracy and national cohesion. As part of the peace process, Ukraine shall reaffirm its commitment to protect all religious communities within its borders, including those affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, while preserving the autonomy and integrity of its own national religious institutions.

Ukraine may adopt a model similar to post-Reformation England, where the state maintained a national church while legally tolerating religious minorities once considered foreign or subversive. In this model:

- The Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) shall remain the official and primary Orthodox body, representing Ukraine's spiritual independence.
- The Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), or its successor institutions, may continue to operate freely as long as:
 - It recognises Ukrainian sovereignty and registers its operations transparently under Ukrainian law.
 - It does not engage in or support political activities that undermine Ukrainian statehood.
 - It respects the rights of individuals to choose their religious affiliation without coercion.
- All religious property disputes shall be resolved through legal mechanisms, not force or intimidation.
- Ukraine will maintain freedom of worship and the protection of religious buildings for all faiths, under international standards.

This framework will support national unity while honouring religious diversity and preventing the misuse of religion as a geopolitical tool.

National Referendum Requirement

In order to implement key provisions of the peace agreement — such as Ukraine's permanent neutrality, constitutional protections for the Russian language, and guarantees of religious freedom — it will be necessary to amend the Constitution of Ukraine. Under Ukrainian law, certain types of constitutional amendments require approval by national referendum.

Constitutional Basis

According to **Article 156** of the Constitution of Ukraine:

"A draft law on introducing amendments to Chapters I, III and XIII of this Constitution is submitted to a **referendum appointed by the President of Ukraine** after its adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by a majority of not less than two-thirds of its constitutional composition."

The chapters referenced include:

- **Chapter I: General Principles** – which contains Article 1 declaring Ukraine a sovereign, independent, democratic, social, and legal state.
- **Chapter III: Elections. Referendum** – outlining how national referenda are to be conducted.
- **Chapter XIII: Introducing Amendments to the Constitution** – which governs the process of constitutional change.

Proposed peace-related amendments, such as:

- Enshrining **permanent neutrality** (likely under Chapter I),
- Establishing official status or protections for **the Russian language**,
- Guaranteeing religious rights for churches linked to foreign institutions,
- Possibly adjusting constitutional language on **sovereignty or territorial administration**,

...would require not only parliamentary approval (300 votes) but also **a national referendum**.

Political and Democratic Legitimacy

Holding a national referendum serves two vital purposes:

1. **Democratic Legitimacy** – It ensures that the Ukrainian people directly approve the foundational terms of peace, strengthening national consensus.
2. **International Credibility** – It demonstrates that Ukraine's commitment to peace and neutrality is not just political but constitutional and endorsed by the public.

It is proposed that the **referendum be held concurrently with the next presidential election**, ensuring high turnout, cost efficiency, and public engagement in Ukraine's future.

This referendum should be accompanied by a national dialogue, allowing all regions and communities to express their views on peace, sovereignty, and the nation's constitutional identity.

Recommended Questions for National Referendum

The following referendum questions are proposed to ratify the peace agreement and implement the required constitutional amendments. Each question should be voted on independently to ensure clarity and democratic legitimacy.

Note: A positive result on any of the above questions will require corresponding amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine. In accordance with Article 156, these amendments must first be passed by a two-thirds vote in the Verkhovna Rada and then submitted to national referendum.

Question 1: Permanent Neutrality

Do you support amending the Constitution of Ukraine to establish permanent neutrality, meaning Ukraine shall not join any military alliances such as NATO or host foreign military bases?

- Yes
- No

Question 2: Recognition of the Russian Language

Do you support amending the Constitution to recognise the Russian language as a regional or minority language with protected cultural and educational rights across Ukraine, in line with European standards?

- Yes
- No

Question 3: Religious Freedoms

Do you support a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom for all Christian denominations, including the recognition and legal protection of churches affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, alongside Ukraine's own Orthodox institutions?

- Yes
- No

Question 4: Internationally Supervised Referenda in Disputed Regions

Do you support holding internationally monitored referenda in the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson Oblasts to determine their future status?

- Yes
- No

Question 5: Peace Treaty Ratification

Do you support the ratification of the peace agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, as approved by the Verkhovna Rada and submitted for public approval?

- Yes
- No

Peacekeeping Force

A peacekeeping force may not be strictly necessary, as international witnesses to the peace agreement will be expected to apply diplomatic and economic consequences in the event of a breach.

However, the inclusion of a peacekeeping mission could provide additional security and confidence during the initial stages of implementation.

If agreed upon by both parties, a peacekeeping force could be included into a peace settlement.

Any such force must be neutral, with a clear mandate to act impartially in response to any violation, regardless of which side is responsible.

It is recommended that, to ensure neutrality and global credibility, the peacekeeping force be deployed under the **United Nations**, with a contingent provided by the **African Union**.

This would demonstrate a multilateral commitment to upholding peace, without favouring the interests of any major power bloc.

Reasons for African Union

The African Union represents a bloc of countries that have largely maintained a position of neutrality throughout the conflict.

African nations have consistently expressed a clear desire for peace and have taken active steps to support peaceful resolution.

Notably, in June 2023, a delegation of African leaders – including representatives from South Africa, Egypt, Senegal, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Comoros, and Uganda – visited both Kyiv and Moscow as part of a formal African Peace Initiative.

This delegation was led by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and presented a 10-point peace proposal. Although no immediate resolution was achieved, this initiative demonstrated Africa's sincere commitment to de-escalation and dialogue.

This proactive diplomacy and balanced engagement illustrate that an African Union peacekeeping contingent under the United Nations banner would act with neutrality, professionalism, and moral authority. Their presence would lend credibility and trust to any peace enforcement mechanism agreed by both parties.

Deployment

Frontline Length

As of 2025, the active front line between Russian and Ukrainian forces extends approximately **1,000 kilometers (621 miles)**. This line traverses multiple oblasts, including Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and parts of Kharkiv and Sumy.

Buffer Zone Specifications

To ensure effective separation and reduce the risk of renewed hostilities, a demilitarized buffer zone is proposed along the entire front line. Drawing from precedents such as the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) between Israel and Syria, where buffer zones range from 0.5 to 10 kilometers wide, a **buffer zone width of 5 kilometers (3.1 miles)** on each side is recommended. This would create a **total buffer width of 10 kilometers (6.2 miles)**.

Peacekeeping Troop Estimates

Estimating the required number of peacekeeping troops involves considering factors such as terrain, population density, and the need for continuous monitoring. While the United Nations does not have a fixed troop-to-area ratio, historical deployments provide some guidance.

- **Cyprus Example:** The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) oversees a buffer zone approximately 180 kilometers long and varying in width, with a deployment of around 858 military personnel.
- **Golan Heights Example:** The UNDOF mission in the Golan Heights covers an 80-kilometer-long buffer zone with widths ranging from 0.5 to 10 kilometers, maintained by a contingent of about 1,000 troops.

Applying a similar ratio and considering the increased complexity and length of the Russia-Ukraine front line, a **peacekeeping force of approximately 20,000 to 30,000 troops** would be necessary to effectively monitor and enforce the ceasefire across the proposed buffer zone.

Deployment Strategy

- **Sector Division:** The front line would be divided into manageable sectors, each overseen by a dedicated peacekeeping contingent.
- **Observation Posts:** Establishing observation posts at regular intervals (e.g., every 10 kilometers) to monitor compliance and report violations.
- **Patrol Units:** Mobile units would conduct regular patrols within their assigned sectors to ensure the integrity of the buffer zone.

- **Rapid Response Teams:** Specialized units prepared to respond swiftly to any incidents or breaches of the ceasefire agreement.

Composition and Command

- **Neutral Forces:** To maintain impartiality, the peacekeeping force should comprise troops from countries that have remained neutral throughout the conflict.
- **United Nations Mandate:** The operation should function under a United Nations mandate to ensure international legitimacy and oversight.
- **African Union Participation:** Given their demonstrated neutrality and commitment to peace, the African Union could play a significant role in contributing troops and leadership to the mission.

Redrawing of borders

The redrawing of borders will reflect the realities on the ground and seek to establish a peaceful, lasting resolution based on the will of local populations and an end to further conflict.

- All referenda must guarantee open campaigning, media access, and safe participation.
- The redrawing of borders shall be recognised by all involved parties and the international community once peace agreements are signed and ratified.
- **Crimea** shall remain under Russian administration pending the outcome of a new internationally supervised referendum to determine its final status.
- **Luhansk oblast** currently under Russian control shall hold a new, internationally observed referendum to determine its future governance. Only the territory currently administered by Russian forces will participate.

- **Donetsk oblast** is partially controlled by Russian forces (approximately 75%), yet the Donetsk People's Republic claims the entire oblast. Two recommended paths forward are proposed:
 - 1.1 A **full oblast-wide referendum**, conducted under international observation, allowing all residents of Donetsk oblast to vote on whether to join Russia or remain part of Ukraine.
 - 1.2 Alternatively, a **referendum in the Russian-occupied portion only**, to determine whether that portion wishes to formally become part of Russia, while the remaining Ukrainian-controlled portion remains within Ukraine, effectively **partitioning the oblast**.
- **Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts** shall be **formally partitioned**:
 - The **territories under Russian control** will hold internationally observed referenda to determine their status (join Russia or remain part of Ukraine).
 - The **Ukrainian-controlled areas** will remain part of Ukraine without further referendum.

These referenda must take place under ceasefire conditions and full international oversight, ensuring transparency, security, and freedom of choice.

All outcomes shall be ratified by Ukraine through a national referendum, alongside necessary constitutional amendments, including a declaration of permanent neutrality.

Adjustment to Mykolaiv Oblast

A small portion of the Kinburn Spit, which is geographically part of the Mykolaiv Oblast, is currently under Russian control and forms a natural extension of the Russian-held territory in Kherson Oblast.

To ensure practical governance and continuity of territorial control, it is proposed that this section of the Kinburn Spit be amalgamated into the partitioned, Russian-administered area of Kherson Oblast.

This adjustment will require a minor redrawing of the border between Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts.

Given the uninhabited or sparsely inhabited nature of the Kinburn Spit and the absence of a distinct civilian population with opposing sentiments, no referendum will be required for this transfer.

(Possible) Adjustment to South-East Kharkiv Oblast

In the south-eastern part of Kharkiv Oblast, near the city of Kupiansk, Russian forces currently occupy territory which was previously under Ukrainian administration. To resolve the status of this region as part of the final peace settlement, two clear options are proposed:

Option 1: Return to Ukraine

The occupied territory would be fully returned to Ukrainian control. This option maintains the administrative integrity of Kharkiv Oblast and restores Ukraine's internationally recognised borders. It would also support the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity central to the peace framework.

Option 2: Incorporation into Luhansk People's Republic

Alternatively, this territory could be incorporated into Luhansk Oblast and included within the proposed borders of the Luhansk People's Republic. This would require redrawing internal oblast boundaries and formal agreement between both parties. A local referendum may be necessary, under international supervision, to determine the preferences of the resident population and ensure legitimacy. The selected course of action should reflect the priorities of peace, stability, and the will of the local population while avoiding prolonged territorial disputes that could reignite hostilities.

Crimea referendum

Question:

Do you support the future of Crimea as either:

Option 1: Crimea shall become and remain a subject of the Russian Federation, with all rights and responsibilities this entails.

Option 2: Crimea shall be reintegrated into Ukraine as an autonomous republic, under the full sovereignty of the Ukrainian state.

The referendum shall be held under international observation, with guarantees of fair campaigning, media access, and freedom from coercion.

Disputed Territories Referenda

These questions are intended to be used during a ceasefire period, conducted under international supervision. The nature and scope of each referendum vary depending on the territorial control and settlement patterns of each oblast:

Donetsk Oblast

Two referendum formats are proposed. One must be agreed upon during peace negotiations:

Option A (Full Oblast Referendum):

Question: Do you support the Donetsk Oblast becoming a subject of the Russian Federation, or remaining as part of Ukraine?

Option B (Partition Referendum in Russian-controlled areas only):

Question: Do you support the permanent separation of the Russian-controlled part of Donetsk Oblast from Ukraine and its integration into the Russian Federation?

Luhansk Oblast

Question: Do you support the Luhansk Oblast becoming a subject of the Russian Federation, or remaining as part of Ukraine?

Zaporizhzhia Oblast (*Partition Referendum in Russian-controlled areas only*)

Question: Do you support the Russian-controlled portion of Zaporizhzhia Oblast being permanently separated from Ukraine and becoming a subject of the Russian Federation?

Kherson Oblast (*Partition Referendum in Russian-controlled areas only*)

Question: Do you support the Russian-controlled portion of Kherson Oblast (including the Kinburn Spit) being permanently separated from Ukraine and becoming a subject of the Russian Federation?

Options on the ballot (where applicable):

- 1. Become a subject of the Russian Federation
- 2. Remain as part of Ukraine

Requirements:

- Voting must be voluntary, free from coercion, and open to all residents of the designated areas, including displaced persons.
- Voting must be monitored by independent international observers.
- The referendum process must be recognised in advance by both Russia and Ukraine as legitimate and binding, with terms formalised during ceasefire negotiations.
- Partition referenda are to be conducted only in the areas currently under Russian control, unless otherwise agreed during negotiations.

Comparison with Previous Peace Proposals

To better understand the strengths of this peace plan, it is important to compare it with previous proposals—specifically the U.S.-sponsored plan of early 2025 and the Istanbul negotiations of April 2022, which were initially agreed upon but later rejected.

Comparison with the U.S. Peace Proposal

Aspect	U.S. Proposal (2025)	This Peace Plan
Ceasefire Implementation	Immediate 30-day ceasefire across all fronts	Gradual winding-down phase, allowing a controlled and stable transition into a ceasefire
Ukraine’s NATO Status	Delayed for up to 20 years	Permanent neutrality enshrined through constitutional referendum

Aspect	U.S. Proposal (2025)	This Peace Plan
Disputed Territories	De facto acceptance of Russian control without recognition	Internationally supervised referenda to determine the will of the local population
Security Guarantees	Buffer zone patrolled by European peacekeepers (excluding U.S.)	Peacekeeping force led by the African Union under UN mandate, emphasising neutrality
Role of Ukraine in Talks	Risk of being marginalised in U.S.-Russia framework	Ukraine is central; all solutions require Ukrainian consent and public ratification
Sanctions Relief	Gradual relief in exchange for compliance	Linked to compliance with peace agreement and verified stability measures
Cultural and Religious Protections	Not clearly specified	Explicit protections for Russian language and Orthodox faith, modelled on UK examples

The U.S. plan, while ambitious, was ultimately rejected by Russia due to insufficient guarantees and rejected by Ukraine due to sovereignty and representation concerns. This peace plan avoids these pitfalls through democratic legitimacy, neutrality, and a phased transition.

Comparison with the April 2022 Istanbul Agreement

Aspect	April 2022 Istanbul Plan	This Peace Plan
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Aspect	April 2022 Istanbul Plan	This Peace Plan
Ceasefire Implementation	Immediate ceasefire	Gradual winding down followed by a verified ceasefire
Ukraine's NATO Status	Ukraine to remain neutral with security guarantees from multiple nations	Permanent neutrality established through referendum, with constitutional amendments
Territorial Issues	Deferred to future negotiations	Resolved through referenda in disputed areas under international supervision
Peacekeeping / Monitoring	No detailed peacekeeping arrangement	Explicit peacekeeping mechanism involving neutral African Union forces
Language and Religion	Not clearly addressed	Inclusion of Russian language rights and religious freedoms in a balanced national framework
Public Legitimacy	Agreement made at executive level only	Final peace deal must be approved via national referendum and legislative process

The April 2022 plan was a significant step toward peace but collapsed under military escalation and political pressure. It also lacked robust international mechanisms and public ratification. This peace plan builds on its foundations by incorporating stronger oversight, broader democratic legitimacy, and detailed implementation mechanisms.

Summary

This peace plan addresses many of the shortcomings of previous initiatives:

- It ensures **democratic legitimacy** through public referendum and constitutional adherence.
- It proposes a **gradual, stabilising transition** into a ceasefire rather than a sudden halt to hostilities.
- It offers a **neutral and credible peacekeeping mechanism** via the African Union, more acceptable to both parties.
- It includes **territorial resolution through referenda**, not imposed concessions.
- It respects **cultural and religious pluralism**, encouraging national unity while maintaining sovereignty.

By learning from and improving upon previous proposals, this peace plan provides a viable and sustainable path forward toward ending the conflict.

Conclusion

This peace plan offers a comprehensive and balanced pathway towards ending the war in Ukraine with honour, justice, and foresight.

It recognises the moral complexities and human costs of prolonged conflict, while emphasising the urgency of protecting innocent lives, restoring Ukraine's sovereignty, and securing lasting peace in Europe.

Key proposals, including a ceasefire, territorial neutrality, security guarantees, phased demilitarisation, and a structured economic recovery, demonstrate that peace is achievable without compromising on core values or dignity. The plan calls for international cooperation, regional security architecture, and mechanisms for accountability, ensuring that no party is rewarded for aggression, while also fostering reconciliation and rebuilding.

Ultimately, "Victory in Peace" is rooted in the belief that true victory is not found on the battlefield, but in the restoration of peace, justice, and the flourishing of nations. This document is a call to leaders, diplomats, and citizens alike to choose the courage of peace over the inertia of war, and to act decisively before more lives are lost and futures destroyed.

Let this be the generation that turned the tide not through vengeance, but through vision.

